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ABSTRACT As the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm gets more attention from academia and industry,
implementation tools of IoT will be explored more and more. One example is the applicability of blockchain
systems to provide security and privacy of IoT networks, which is the topic of this article. Blockchain systems
are on the rise, as crypto-currency payment systems (such as Bitcoin, Litecoin, etc.) boomed in the last
few years due to their attractive de-centralized and anonymous features. As in every transaction, access of
the users to IoT systems needs to be controlled. However, these systems are peer-to-peer systems and do
not have centralized control, which means that traditional access control techniques will not be optimal.
As a result, distributed access control schemes are needed and this paper aims at providing the state of the
art in the literature. Thereby, we introduce and discuss the details and applicability of centralized (role-
based) and distributed (threshold-signature, reputation, trusted-computing, identity, capability, ACL, group-
signature, and hybrid) access control schemes to blockchain systems under the IoT ecosystems. Moreover,
permissioned vs. permissionless blockchain systems are also discussed. Finally, challenges and research
directions related to the application of all those presented blockchain systems to IoT are discussed.
INDEX TERMS IoT, survey, P2P, security, Bitcoin, permissioned, permissionless, ledger, LoRa.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is having its boom era now, as the
Internet had two decades ago. Accordingly, the IoT market is
growing and expected to reach to a number of 75 billion by
2025 [1], and 500 billion by 2030 [2].
With the proliferation of IoT enabling technologies such
as LoRa (Long-Range), application domains of IoT are
expected to grow in various fields including following areas
but not limited to [3]–[5]:
• Smart Electric, Gas andWater metering: This field is
expected to witness the biggest growth rate. Traditional
power grid is being replaced by its smarter counterpart,
i.e. smart-grid, and therefore smart-metering is one of
the most important component that lets us understand
the energy consumption at all the levels of the power
grid. The adoption of IoT technology by this sector
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Antonino Orsino .
would promote rapid standardization among various
smart-meter manufacturers and vendors.
• Oil and gas operations: IoT connected devices and
systems can provide more efficient oil and gas opera-
tions, by requiring minimum human-intervention, and
constitute higher value than legacy technologies.
• Smart cities: According to [6], LoRaWAN (LoRa-
based Wide Area Network) has been selected as an
enabling technology to monitor not only light illumi-
nation levels (monitoring of street lighting), but also
traffic intensity and air pollution levels of a smart city
application.
• Healthcare: Activity of Daily Living (ADL) helps to
indicate health status and capabilities of the individuals
in terms of heath care and quality living. In the recent
past, most common ways to capture ADL data includes
costly day long observations by assigned health-care
personnel, self-reporting by the users themselves with
great efforts, or in the most primitive way, filling out
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a written ADL survey. However, proliferation of IoT
sensing technologies pave the path towards automated
ADL reading, as deeply discussed in [7].
• Livestock monitoring: In another project called Cattle
Traxx, LoRaWAN has been used for remote-monitoring
of the cows in a farm by using electronic-tracking ear
tags [8].
This work is an extremely enhanced version of the previ-
ous work, which presented the access control for wireless
sensor networks [9]. Now the paper discusses applicabil-
ity of the distributed access control over blockchain sys-
tems within the scope of IoT security. The paper aims at
two important goals: 1) Providing the state-of-art on access
control systems proposed for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) networks
and elaborate on their applicability to permissioned-BCSs,
2) Discuss and predict applicability of permissioned-BCSs to
IoT networks, especially for increasing security in the IoT
networks.
There are many perspectives exist in the literature for
the presentation of Blockchain: Consensus type (public, pri-
vate, and consortium), consensus algorithm (Proof-of-Work,
Round Robin, Byzantine-Fault Tolerance, Proof-of-Stake,
etc.), access control (permissioned vs. permissionless), net-
work structure (centralized vs distributed), etc. [10]. More-
over, recently presented Blockchain algorithms for IoT in the
literature can be categorized into 3 major groups based on
the ‘role’ of the blockchain [11]: 53% on Data Storage, 28%
on Access Control Mechanism, and finally 19% on Platform
connector and incentive distributor. In this article we pick
the access control presentation of Blockchain and seek for
its’ application as an access control mechanism for IoT.
Owing to the absence of a physical line-of-defense,
cyber-security of IoT is of a big concern to the scientific com-
munity [12]. In this work, it is argued that Blockchain Sys-
tems (BCSs) can be leveraged by IoT networks (for instance
LoRa-based IoT networks) to increase security. However, tra-
ditional permissionless-BCSs such as electronic cash systems
(Bitcoin, Litecoin, etc.) cannot be used in special applications
presented above due to the long transaction times. At this
point, permissioned-BCSs would help. Permissioned-BCSs
require access control to improve the security of the over-
all system and to decrease the transaction time in the
blockchain.
The main focus of this manuscript is justifying the appli-
cability of P2P access control schemes for the security of
IoT-based Block Chain Systems. As such, the organization
for the rest of the work is as follows: Section II provided back-
ground on P2P networks (Section II-A) and on access control
(Section II-B). Section II-C provides a small introduction to
BCSs. Section III presents a thorough literature review of
access control systems proposed for P2P networks, whereas
Section IV discusses on the selection of those schemes to be
employed by the permissioned-BCSs. Section V elaborates
on the applicability of permissioned-BCSs to LoRa-based
IoT networks. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper and
draws the future work.
II. BACKGROUND
Blockchain is a relatively new technology proposed for
digital crypto-currencies. This idea was originally designed
and invented by Bayer et al. [13] in 1992 and included
Merkle trees to provide the efficiency and reliability of the
digital time-stamps. Hayek published his classic book of
‘Denationalization of Money’ [14] in 1976 and argued that
money is the same as other commodities and it needs to
be supplied by competition among private providers, not
by the government. The ‘crypto-currency’ term has urged
from that perspective and nowadays uses the blockchain
technology as the back-haul system for the transactions [15].
Besides, crypto-currency also attracted public attention to the
blockchain technology, allowing researchers and developers
to work and innovate by transforming and providing this
technology for today’s challenging needs.
Blockchain-based security algorithms provide decentral-
ized solutions but involve significant energy, delay and com-
putational overhead which is not suitable for resource con-
strained devices of the IoT. For example, Dorri et al. [16]
have proposed usage of blockchain technology in security
and privacy of IoT. In the proposal, high processing enabled
miner devices are employed and additionally attached to
the home network, to provide needs and functionalities of
the blockchain algorithms. However, proof-of-concept appli-
cations need to be developed and further analyzed in this
manner.
Hence the aim of this manuscript does not include detailed
representation of blockchain systems, the readers are sug-
gested to read following references for that purpose: [11],
[17]–[21]. Moreover, interested readers are recommended to
follow; [22]–[24] for the cyber-security of Blockchain sys-
tems, and [25]–[28] for background on the cyber-security of
IoT networks.
As blockchain network being a type of Peer-to-Peer
(P2P) networks, in the rest of this section, P2P networks
are first introduced, then access control schemes proposed
for P2P networks are investigated. Then, a brief introduc-
tion and classification of blockchain systems (BCSs) is
introduced. Finally, BCSs and their applicability to IoT
Networks is thoroughly elaborated for various application
domains.
A. PEER-TO-PEER (P2P) NETWORKS
A P2P network is any distributed network architecture
composed of participants that make a portion of their
resources (such as processing power, disk storage or net-
work bandwidth) directly available to other network partic-
ipants, without the need for central coordination instances
(such as servers or stable hosts). Peers are both suppliers
and consumers of resources, in contrast to the traditional
client–server model where only servers supply, and clients
consume. A P2P network architecture is shown in Fig. 1
which consists of peers and lacking dedicated infrastructure
such as servers and back-end devices [29].
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FIGURE 1. Representation of the architecture of a Peer-to-Peer (P2P)
network consisting 6-nodes.
There are 3 classes of P2P applications that is worth to
mention:
• Parallelizable: Splits a large task into smaller pieces
that execute in parallel at a number of independent peer
nodes
• Content-based: Focuses on storing information at var-
ious peers in the network. Operates in a disconnected,
asynchronous manner.
• Collaborative: Allows peers to collaborate in real
time, without relying on central servers to collect and
relay information. Upcoming collaborative P2P net-
works are looking for diverse peers that can bring in
unique resources and capabilities to a virtual environ-
ment thereby empowering it to engage in greater tasks
beyond those that can be accomplished by individual
peers, yet that are beneficial to all the peers [30].
There are several unique characteristics of P2P networks
which bring their own challenges along with: First of all,
there is an absence of server infrastructure and also lack
of trusted authority. Secondly, there is a dynamic type of
membership which often implies dynamic topology that com-
plicates routing as well as security. Besides, it demands for
opportunistic collaboration, meaning that collaborated mem-
bers are rewarded. Finally, the content management such as
placement and retrieval is also another non-trivial task to be
fulfilled.
Here is an overview of vast application areas of P2P
networks:
• Content Delivery: In P2P networks, clients both pro-
vide and use resources. This means that contrary to
client-server systems, the content-serving capacity of
P2P networks can actually increase as more users start
to access the content. This property is one of the major
advantages of using P2P networks because it makes the
setup and operation costs very small for the original
content distributor. [29] These are mostly known to be
file sharing platforms: Gnutella, Kazaa, Napster, EMule,
eDonkey, Lime, etc.
• Finance: Blockchain payment systems (electronic cash
systems) such as Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, etc.
• Networking: Dalesa (a P2P web cache for LANs) is
a free and opensource software developed by Lanka
Software Foundation under GPL license. Dalesa can be
used as an alternative to centralized web caches in a
LANs. This is done by exposing the cashes of the local
web browser to the whole P2P network [31].
• Science: In bio-informatics, drug identification search
engines, scientific file sharing (Sci-Hub).
• Voice over IP (VoIP): Voice over Internet Protocol
(VoIP), also known as IP telephony, is a method of
technologies for the delivery of voice communications
and multimedia sessions over IP networks, such as the
Internet. Discord, Skype, Google Talk, etc. are exam-
ples of commonly known VoIP applications. VoIP is
achieved by special protocols, such as Jingle, which is
an extension to the Extensible Messaging and Presence
Protocol (XMPP) that adds up P2P signaling for VoIP
communications [32].
• Defense: Modern warfare network projects by DARPA
(USA) take advantage of this technology. For instance,
small cameras use P2P networking technology to fuse
data into high-resolution color images in PIXNET
project.While PIXNETworks on inter-squad P2P image
sharing, other DARPA programs are focused on using
soldiers’ smartphones as servers in inter-squad-level net-
works [33].
B. ACCESS CONTROL
The term Access Control refers to the control over system
resources after a user’s account credentials along with the
identity have been authenticated. As a result of a successful
attempt, access to the system or resources is granted. Access
can be granted for individual users or for a group of users
and granted destination can be a unique or multiple types of
resources. For example, a particular user, or group of users,
might only be permitted access to some certain files after
logging into a system, while simultaneously being denied
access to all other resources.
Access Control provides a solution to the confidentiality
and it is the key mechanism to achieve restricting access to
the data sources we want to protect [9], [34]. Access control
policies and mechanisms are necessary to ensure that peers
only use the resources in an authorized way. Trust is the
expectation that a peer will behave in a particular manner for a
specific purpose. An access control mechanism must prevent
unauthorized peers from becoming a part of the network and
to establish trust among members in the absence of a trusted
authority.
P2P systems as well as mobile ad hoc groups are catego-
rized as ad hoc groups. These groups are characterized by
two key features, the lack of trusted authority, and a dynamic
membership which often implies a dynamic topology. These
features introduce new challenges such as content placement
and retrieval, routing, and security.
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Content based P2P application focuses on storing infor-
mation at various peers in the network and operate in a
disconnected, asynchronousmanner whilst other applications
such as conferencing require synchronous operation.
Access control requirements for P2P Networks are catego-
rized under 2 groups:
1) MAIN REQUIREMENTS OF ACCESS CONTROL
FOR P2P NETWORKS
The main requirements that an access control framework for
P2P networks should support are:
• No centralized control or support: A peer has sig-
nificant level of autonomy and is in charge of stor-
ing and managing its own access control policies
(decentralization).
• Peer classification: A P2P access control model must
provide a mechanism for a host peer to classify users
and assign each user different access rights, even if the
users were previously unknown.
• Encourage sharing files: peers must be confident that
participation in the system will give them better chance
to access to the files they want.
• Limit spreading of malicious and harmful content:A
P2P access control system should provide mechanisms
to limit such malicious spreading and punish those who
are involved in.
2) AUXILIARY REQUIREMENTS OF ACCESS CONTROL FOR
P2P NETWORKS
The auxiliary requirements that an Access Control Frame-
work for P2P Networks should support are:
• Dynamic topology:HenceAccess Control Lists (ACLs)
enumerate all possible members permanently, static
ACLs cannot be used because of the dynamic topology
of the network where memberships change frequently.
• Autonomy: Host peer is a standalone system where
shared files are objects that need to be protected and
client peers are subjects who are considered to possess
access rights.
• Trusted peer authentication and authorization in
client platform: In distributed and decentralized sys-
tems, an object or policy owner needs to trust that the
valid peer is authenticated and authorized in a client
platform before being allowed to access a protected
object.
C. BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS (BCS)
There are two types of BCSs, public and private [35]:
1) Public BCSs are also called ‘permissionless’
blockchain. The access control is not mandatory for
these systems as of now. Bad mannered participants
can join the network for ledger operations yet this will
not affect overall system, on the assumption that the
number of adversaries cannot be more than 50% of the
overall network members.
2) Private BCSs are also called ‘permissioned’, ‘consor-
tium’, or ‘hybrid’ blockchain. It is used for the systems
in which access control is inevitably necessary. Hence,
they cater for the ledger needs of private corporations
or consortium’s.
Please refer to Fig. 2 for the various applications
(mostly digital crypto-currencies) fields of permissioned- vs.
permissionless-BCSs [36]. Among permissioned-BCS, Tillit
and Ripple Labs are based on XRP (Ripple coin), Hyper-
ledger is based on PBFT (Practical Byzantine Fault Toler-
ance), CryptoCorp and Tembusu are based on BTC (Bitcoin),
Eris and Clearmatics are based on Ethereum, and finally,
Tezos is based on the consensus-agnostic algorithm.
D. APPLICATIONS OF BCSs TO IoT NETWORKS
In the recent literature, several approaches are proposed as
an application of BCSs to IoT (some of which are presented
in Kim and Deka’s book) [37]. Here, we will classify and
present these under 2 major categories:
1) CLASSIFICATION DUE TO THE PROVIDED SECURITY
SERVICES
• Access Control:
– Nakamura et al. [38] proposes a Capability-Based
Access Control (CapBAC) scheme by applying the
emerging Ethereum blockchain technology, to pro-
vide more fine-grained access control and more
flexible token management.
– Chattaraj et al. proposes a Blockchain-based access
control scheme for the Software Defined Net-
work SDN) framework [39]. The proposed scheme
has the capability to resist various well-known
attacks and alleviate the existing single point of
controller failure issue in SDN.
– Riabi et al. [40], surveyed BCS-based access
control schemes proposed for IoT networks.
According to authors, there are two main cat-
egories: 1) Transaction-based access control,
2) Smart-contract -based access control. In both of
the categories, the aim is to provide an access token
to the intended user or thing of the IoT. Authors
stressed that one of the main benefit of using BCSs
as an access control mechanism is to avoid single
point of failure, which is the main problem for
traditional centralized systems. Riabi et al. also
proposed their own access control scheme in [41],
which relies on BCS to avoid single point of failures
(central entity) in IoT. The proposed scheme is a
hybrid scheme leveraging ACL, capability-based
and identity-based access control schemes.
• Consent Management: In [42], Rantos et al. proposed
a framework that facilitates European General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR)-compliant processing of
personal data in IoT networks. Their proposal utilize
BCS to support the integrity, the non-repudiation and the
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FIGURE 2. Various applications of permissionless vs. permissioned blockchain ledgers.
versioning of consents in a public verifiable way without
any trusted party.
• Hardware-Assisted Security: In [43], Mohanty et al.
presented usage of blockchain for sustainable simulta-
neous device and data security in the IoT, which was
particularly focused on the integration of BCSs with
hardware security primitives called physical unclonable
functions (PUFs) to solve scalability, latency, and energy
requirement challenges of the IoT.
• Intellectual Property Protection: In [44], Lin et al.
proposed a system architecture of blockchain and IoT
based intellectual property protection system, which can
process three types of intellectual property: 1) Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks etc.; 2) Industrial design, Trade
dress, Craft works, Trade secrets etc.; and 3) Plant vari-
ety rights, Geographical indications etc.
• Secure Communications: In [45], Wazid et al. pre-
sented usage of blockchain for communications security
in intelligent IoT, which was particularly focused on
the authentication and key management issues. Another
secure communication framework is presented in Wazid
et al.’s work [46], for the Blockchain-Based Intelligent
Battlefield IoT environment.
• Security framework for SDN: A blockchain enabled
distributed security framework for next generation IoT
networks by using edge-cloud and software defined
networking (SDN) is presented in Medhane et al.’s
work [47]. Accordingly, the security attack detection is
achieved at the cloud layer, and security attacks are con-
sequently reduced at the edge layer of the IoT network.
• Smart contracts: Smart contracts can be established for
IoT by using Blockchain technology [10].
• Trust Management: In [48], Kandah et al. present
a multi-tier scheme consisting of an authentication-
and trust-building/distribution framework designed with
blockchain technology to ensure the safety and validity
of the information exchanged in the Smart City systems
and Connected Vehicle Setups. The blockchain-based
trust management scheme aims at creating a trustwor-
thy environment for connected autonomous vehicles.
The presented quantitative simulation results point the
trade-offs of secure block generation for local and global
trust calculations vs. mobility. In [49], Lu et al. proposed
a trust-management scheme (set-up and distribution) for
smart cities and connected vehicles to ensure the safety
and validity of the information exchanged in the IoT
network based on blockchain technology.
2) CLASSIFICATION DUE TO THE APPLICATION LANDSCAPE
• Cyber-Physical Systems: As discussed in
Zhao et al.’s work [50], Blockchain can play a crit-
ical at cyber-physical systems (CPS) where Internet
of Things (IoT) are heavily used to collect sensed
data regarding the environment and the system being
monitored. Moreover, blockchain could encourage and
facilitate data and service sharing across multiple orga-
nizations because it enforces a standard way of commu-
nication and data storage (i.e., interoperability), and has
a built-in real-time micro-payment capability.
• Intelligent Transportation System (ITS): Vangala
et al. [51] proposed a new Blockchain-enabled
certificate-based authentication scheme for vehicle acci-
dent detection and notification in environment, so that
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a vehicle can report securely the transactions related
to accident detection and notification of its own or
neighboring vehicles to its cluster head, Road Side Unit,
or edge servers.
• Smart City: Dewan and Singh [20] proposed
Blockchain-based solution for smart property which
provides security against forgery when compared to the
traditional centralized database systems. They offered
this as a use-case of Blockchain in designing smart city.
• Supply chain management:Blockchain can be utilized
by supply chainmanagement to track and trace the origin
of the food products in agriculture [52].
• Underwater Things: In [53], Uddin et al. proposes a
layer-based architecture consisting of Fog and Cloud
elements to process and store the Internet of Under-
water Things (IoUT) data securely with customized
Lightweight Blockchain technology.
Due to Makridakis and Christodoulou [54], Blockchain’s
ability towards security and immutability can also be used for
storing the highly sensitive, personal data needed to deter-
mine patterns in sensitive cases such as those involving the
healthcare sector. The future of blockchain might move in
two far directions: The first will include all those applica-
tions requiring decentralized, super secured networks. IoT,
autonomous vehicles, Decentralized Autonomous Organiza-
tions, smart contracts would be included in this category. The
other direction will include advances in the Artificial Intelli-
gence that when combined with Blockchain can substantially
improve its over-all value and application landscape.
As presented above, although there has been new pro-
posals in the field to apply BCSs for the access control of
IoT, all of the proposals are in the primitive phase and yet
to be proven by implementations, cross comparisons and
thorough evaluations. Besides, in most of these proposals,
access control is offered through permission-less BCSswhich
require demanding power and processor consumption, there-
fore mostly not applicable to the tiny micro devices of the
IoT that are used nowadays. More importantly, another crit-
ical issue is the total time required for each access process
event (login attempt); it would be really bad from Quality
of Service point of view (timeliness), if a user is expected
to wait several seconds to be granted for the services that
he/she would like to use. Especially for the networks and
services that require fast response time (real time or close
to real time), BCSs have not been used or proven to provide
safe operation. Therefore, in this article, ways of improving
the access process time is sought, by leveraging especially the
schemes designed for distributed P2P networks, as described
below.
III. ACCESS CONTROL IN P2P NETWORKS
In the literature, two groups of solutions are proposed for
access control problem in P2P networks, based on the loca-
tion of the decision-taking:
• Centralized Approach: A central server stores and
evaluates access control policies. A centralized authority
identifies users, defines roles and groups, controls the
access rights. Central or trusted third parties monitor
and manage access control. There is only one type of
centralized approach: Role-based.
• Distributed Approach: Peers have a significant level
of autonomy and are in charge of storing and manag-
ing their own access control policies. This can be also
considered as distribution of trust from central authority
to peers, which is the basic idea behind the execution of
recent crypto-currency schemes (a.k.a. blockchain trans-
action). The proposed solutions for distributed access
control in P2P networks are as follows: Threshold sig-
nature based, Reputation-based (trust vectors), Trusted
computing (platform) based, Identity based, Capabil-
ity based, ACL based, Group Signature based, and
finally Hybrid based; Approach-1 (credential + iden-
tity + role), Approach-2 (threshold cryptography +
secret sharing + hierarchical identity).
All centralized and distributed access control approaches
in the literature are discussed in details as follows:
A. CENTRALIZED ACCESS CONTROL FOR P2P NETWORKS
The only type of centralized access control solution for P2P
networks is Role-Based Access Control (RBAC). In RBAC-
based approach, the permissions are associated with the
roles, and the users are assigned to appropriate roles, thereby
acquiring the role’s associated permission. Since roles are
considered for access control decisions instead of identities,
the scalability will be increased in a large distributed P2P
environment. Three primary rules are defined for RBAC [55]:
1) Assignment of the roles:A subject can execute a trans-
action only if the subject has been selected or assigned
to a role.
2) Authorization of the roles: A subject’s active role
must be authorized for that specific subject. Associated
with the rule-1, this rule guarantees that the users can
take-on only roles for which they are authorized to.
3) Authorization of the transactions:A subject can exe-
cute a transaction, only if the transaction is authorized
for the subject’s current active role. Associated with
rule-1 and rule-2, rule-3 guarantees that the users can
only execute transactions for which they are authorized
to.
In [56], Park et al. propose a two-tier ultra-peer archi-
tecture in which the access control decisions, searching for
resources and resource management are handled by ultra-
peers. In this paper, authors introduce an approach for secur-
ing transactions in the P2P environment and investigate ways
to incorporate RBAC into current P2P computing environ-
ments. A regular peer requests a particular resource and the
requesting peer’s ultra-peer does the query for the resource
on behalf of the regular peer. If there is a peer that has
the requested source, the providing peer’s ultra-peer makes
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an access control decision to determine if the requester has
the enough privileges. Ultra-peers act as proxies for their
leaf-nodes and can provide more effective and scalable access
control in dynamic computing environments.
In another proposed scheme of Park and Hwang [57],
a manager application, located in the middle-ware of each
peer, facilitates provisioning capacities for use of resources
and controls usage of resource on behalf of that peer. An inte-
grated model which supports autonomous decisions and cen-
tralized controls is introduced. The RBAC model is extended
to support access control in a controlled P2P environment.
The environment contains a manager who facilitates provi-
sioning capacities for use of resources and controls usage of
resource on behalf of a peer. The community and enterprise
User Role Assignments are maintained in a centralized man-
ner, while the PermissionRoleAssignments aremaintained in
a distributed manner. The proposed approach enables a peer
to make the access control decision autonomously based on
the enterprise, the community and the peer policies without
needing other components.
B. THRESHOLD SIGNATURE BASED DISTRIBUTED
ACCESS CONTROL
Threshold cryptography (or threshold signatures) is the
basic tool to implement distributed access control mecha-
nisms.The idea of threshold signatures applies directly to
build access control mechanisms by making collaborative
decisions. A prospective member and a set of existing group
members interacts in order to approve the new membership.
The number of current members taking part in the admission
is at least the number necessary for the admission thresh-
old which is less than the total number of group members.
(t + 1, n) threshold cryptography employs the secret sharing
of the group secret among n members in such a manner that
any set of (t + 1) members can recover the group secret and
perform a cryptographic operation jointly.
Static ACL cannot be used because of the dynamic topol-
ogy of the network where memberships change frequently,
because ACLs enumerate all possible members permanently.
Admission decisions made by a trusted third party (TTP) or
a group founder violates the peer nature of the underlying ad
hoc group. Decentralized access control is the fundamental
security service for ad hoc groups. It prevents unauthorized
nodes from becomingmembers and bootstrapping other secu-
rity services such as key distribution.
Threshold signature scheme enables any subgroup of
t members in a group to collaboratively sign a message on
behalf of that group. This is achieved by secret-sharing the
signature key among the group members, and allowing them
to compute a signature on some message via a distributed
protocol in which the members use the shares of the signature
key instead of the key itself. Threshold signature schemes
can tolerate up to t corruptions in the whole lifetime of the
system. The idea of threshold signatures applies directly to
build access control mechanisms by making collaborative
decisions.
In [58], Saxena et al. propose and evaluate four different
P2P access control schemes based on various cryptographic
techniques:
1) RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman algorithm)-based
threshold signature
2) DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm)-based
threshold signature
3) Plain signature (PS)
4) Accountable Subgroup Multi-signature (ASM)
Their evaluation results are provided as follows: PS offers
lower join cost but longer Group Membership Certificates
(GMCs), whereas other schemes, have shorter (ASM) or con-
stant (TS-RSA/TS-DSA) GMCs but high join cost. In these
schemes, authentication of the P2P users is the main goal, not
their authorization.
In another work of Saxena et al. [59], authors pro-
pose 3 types of threshold cryptography based access con-
trol schemes: DSA-based, BLS-based, and Schnorr-based.
Among these, the Schnorr threshold cryptography based
access control scheme is the best in terms of performance
(assures the same security level with less processing time).
Authors made two definitions: Verifiability, a new member
must ascertain the validity of the acquired certificate and
secret share. Traceability, when the new member detects that
its certificate and/or secret are not valid, it must be able to
trace bogus partial signatures or shares. Overall, authors main
goal here was again the authentication of the P2P users, not
their authorization.
C. REPUTATION BASED DISTRIBUTED ACCESS CONTROL
Reputation-based systems are used to establish trust among
members of on-line communities where parties with no prior
information of each other use the feedback from their peers
to assess the trustworthiness of the peers in the community.
The protocol proposed by Selcuk et al. [60] is a
reputation-based distributed trust architecture for P2P net-
works which helps establishing trust among good peers as
well as identifying the malicious peers and preventing the
spread of malicious content In the proposed protocol users
rate the reliability of the parties they deal with, and share this
information with their peers.
In [61], Tran et al. describe the access rule as follows:
Any client peer who has its overall trust value and overall
contribution score equal to or greater than the corresponding
thresholds can access to the file. In the proposed Access
Control Framework, provides P2P users better access control
services whilst preserving the decentralized structure of the
P2P platform. The peers in a P2P network need the autonomy
of controlling accesses to their files. Discretionary Access
Control (DAC) model is used in which the control of access
rights is left to the discretion of the owner of the file.
The host peer is a standalone system where shared files
are objects that need to be protected and client peers are
subjects who are considered to possess access rights. Files on
host peer are rated depending on their size and content; each
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file being assigned two thresholds which capture two access
aspects, namely trust and contribution. Whereas, the client
peer is responsible to collect recommendations that contain
the information needed to evaluate its access values for a
particular host.
After each transaction, direct trust and direct contribution
of both the client peer and host peers are updated accordingly
to the satisfaction level of the transaction. This affects the
future evaluation of the access values between these two
peers. The more a peer uploads its files to the network,
the more likely that peer will be able to download its desired
files from the network.
The authentication and access control layer is responsible
for authenticating partner peers, calculating access values,
granting access to files, and updating local access control
policy.
A fairness-based participation is the main goal here.
A client who wishes to download a file needs to have both
of its access values (trustworthiness and contribution) equal
to or greater than the corresponding thresholds of the file.
The access values are relative and assessed on a peer to peer
basis. They are computed from combinations of four different
scores:
• Direct trust: represents the host’s belief on the client’s
capacities, honesty and reliability based on the host’s
direct experiences.
• Indirect trust: based on recommendations from other
peers, hence it is based on other’s observations, it is less
reliable when compared to direct trust.
• Direct contribution: measures the contribution of the
client to the host in terms of information value down-
loaded and uploaded between them.
• Indirect contribution: measures the contribution of the
client to the network in terms of information volume the
client exchange with other peers.
The proposed scheme for evaluating a transaction, not only
helps to differentiate poorly performing peers from good
ones, but also ensures that malicious peers are punished and
isolated.
D. TRUSTED COMPUTING BASED DISTRIBUTED
ACCESS CONTROL
By using trusted computing technologies, a referencemonitor
in a platform can act as an agent of an object owner to enforce
access control policies, which states that an object can only
be accessed in a genuine platform with applications in valid
states, such as integrity and configuration.
In [62], Sandhu et al. propose the Trusted Reference Mon-
itor (TRM), a trusted computing architecture on the appli-
cation layer, which provides a solution to access control by
using trusted computing. In the proposed scheme, fulfill-
ment of security policies are achieved by the integrity and
state of the platform along with the software running on the
platform. It uses Trusted Embedded Platforms in order to
support access control. The proposed architecture enforces
an object owner’s policy in a client platform by attesting the
authenticity of the platform and the integrity of the requesting
application.
A TRM is responsible for ensuring that the resources that
it protects do not leak into other applications. The proposed
scheme enforces access control policies in the application
layer by leveraging underlying trusted computing functions.
Hardware and operating system security (secure kernel) are
the main concerns of this approach. It provides a solution to
access control on application layer by using trusted comput-
ing. It focuses on operating system and hardware related secu-
rity on mobile devices. By using proposed trusted computing
technologies, a reference monitor in a platform can act as an
agent of an object owner to enforce access control policies,
which states that an object can only be accessed in a genuine
platform with applications in valid states, such as integrity
and configuration.
E. IDENTITY BASED DISTRIBUTED ACCESS CONTROL
In [63], Saxena et al. proposed an Identity-based Access
Control scheme for the groups called ‘‘Identity-based Group
Admission Control’’. In this proposal, the communication
efficiency was the primary goal. A prospective member and
a set of existing group members interact in order to approve
the new membership. The number of current members taking
part in the admission should at least be equal to the number
necessary for the admission threshold, which is less than
the total number of group members. A secure membership
revocation is also presented in order to provide a fare network
service. The proposed scheme is an alternative to the Thresh-
old Cryptography (Threshold-signature -based) solutions and
much more applicable than those schemes if communication
bandwidth and battery power are of prime concerns.
F. CAPABILITY BASED DISTRIBUTED ACCESS CONTROL
In the proposed Capability-based Access Control scheme of
Kim et al. [64], a client should present a valid capability
certificate to access a service. A Capability Certificate states
that an entity which is able to demonstrate knowledge of
the corresponding private key has been transferred the rights
listed in the certificate by the issuer. Digital Signatures are
used to protect capability certificates and if these certificates
contain access rights then they are called authorization cer-
tificates. Different access rights to a service can be granted
depending on authenticated authorization certificates. The
proposed scheme builds a multi-layered platform based on a
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which allows peers to com-
municate securely. It uses Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL)
in order to revoke capabilities from the peers.
In P2P networks, secure transaction is of paramount impor-
tance due to sheer size and the policy of non-intervention
nature of internet. For instance, let us consider E-speak which
was first developed at HP Labs in late 1995 [65]. E-Speak
is an e-services infrastructure where services advertise, dis-
cover, and inter-operate with each other in a dynamic and
secure way. The E-Speak security adopts a multi-layered
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approach and builds a range of protection mechanisms on
top of the PKI. It offers a range of protection mechanisms
including authentication, content integrity, visibility control
and capability-based access control. The E-Speak security is
designed to prevent attacks ranging from traffic analysis to
eavesdropping to message tampering to deletion to identity
theft. Deployment assumption of E-Speak security is based
on the unavailability of central security administration. The
security infrastructure assumed to scale up to millions of
machines. Though, it is recommended that message confi-
dentiality andmessage authentication should not be taken for
granted.
In E-Speak, a client should present a valid capability cer-
tificate to access a service. The service authenticates the
capability certificate by verifying the client’s knowledge of
the private key corresponding to the given public key. The
results of authentication are cached so that the same authenti-
cation need not be repeated on every access. Different access
rights to a service can be granted depending on authenticated
authorization certificates.
G. ACCESS CONTROL LIST BASED DISTRIBUTED
ACCESS CONTROL
An Access Control List (ACL) is a list of permissions
attached to an object. An ACL specifies the users and/or
system processes that are granted access to the object as
well as the operations that are allowed on the given objects.
Typically, each entry in an ACL specifies a subject and
an operation. In [66], Fenkam et al. provide a solution to
implement access control for mobile P2P systems in col-
laborative environments. The system provides access control
services in mobile teamwork platform (MOTION) in which
teammembers communicate in a P2Pmanner. Two categories
of peers are distinguished, Level-1 (L1) and Level-2 (L2):
L1 peers have the capacity of maintaining a regular security
infrastructure and are superior than L2 peers. They have
complete intelligence for assigning permissions, removing
permissions, validating and storing ACLs. L2 peers have
devices which are lacking resources to maintain a regular
security infrastructure.
A community leader (L1 peer) can be defined for each
community and can be given the right to further assign this
right to members (L2 peers) of the community. In a multi-
layered access control approach, permissions (in the form of
ACLs) are distributed according to the capacity of the peers’
resources.
H. GROUP SIGNATURE BASED DISTRIBUTED
ACCESS CONTROL
A peer group is characterized by a flat structure meaning that
there is no hierarchy among members and all members have
identical rights and duties. There is no underlying assumption
of a centralized authority that provides security services such
as access control or key management. In group environments
where secure any-to-any communication among all members
is needed, group admission needs to be tightly integrated with
group key management.
In group signature schemes, all group members are peers
and any member can sign on behalf of the group in an
anonymous and unlinkable manner. Therefore, neither online
presence of all signers nor membership awareness is nec-
essary, which is practical for asynchronous groups. In [67],
Kim et al. proposed group admission is as three steps:
1) Creation of the group charter (ACL).
2) Interaction between a prospective member and the
group (voting).
3) Interaction between the new group member and the
group authority.
The group authority presents an access control file for differ-
ent kinds of peer groups and matches them with appropriate
cryptographic techniques and protocols.
I. HYBRID DISTRIBUTED ACCESS CONTROL
In order to provide stronger security, hybrid distributed
access control schemes inherit 2 or more of the access control
schemes presented above.
The solution proposed by Lu et al. [68] integrates the
credential-based, identity-based, and role-based access con-
trol policies. A role mapping technique is employed which
does not require centralized authority. This paper presents pri-
mary copy/backup copy (PB) architecture to support a decen-
tralized access control, not only for usability and scalability,
but also for security particularly. The PB strategy is employed
to take the function of fault-tolerant network structure and has
been used for fault-tolerant dynamic scheduling of tasks in
multiprocessor systems.
Another solution proposed by Tseng et al. [69]
integrates the threshold cryptography-based (Feldman’s
threshold private key generation), the secret sharing-based
(Pederson’s distributed secret sharing function generation),
and the hierarchical identity-based (Gentry-Silverberg’s
encryption/signature) access control policies all together.
The proposed scheme is called hierarchical identity based
PKI (HIDPKI) and supports secure opportunistic collabora-
tion among peers. It operates in server-less environments.
Admission of new peer nodes and maintenance of peer
administrative domains are managed by groups of peers
capable of performing verifiable secret sharing and joint
secret sharing operations. HIDPKI provides peer nodes with
private keys that match with public keys derived from the
identity of the peer nodes and the services they are authorized
to offer or use.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF LEGACY P2P ACCESS CONTROL
SCHEMES TO BLOCKCHAIN SYSTEMS FOR IoT
As the name implies, centralized P2P access control schemes
such as RBAC schemes, require centralized administration
of the roles, users and transactions. Therefore, they are not
applicable to Blockchain Systems (BCSs) for IoT, in which
de-centralization of the control (distributed decision-taking)
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TABLE 1. Applicability of Legacy P2P Access Control Schemes to Blockchain Systems for IoT including pros vs. cons.
is the main goal. The details of the different distributed P2P
access control schemes are outlined below, also see Table 1
for their applicability to BCSs for IoT, including pros vs. cons
of each P2P access control scheme:
• Threshold-signature -based requires distributed
administration and provides a good solution for authen-
tication and revocation steps of the access control, hence
applicable to BCSs for IoT.
• Reputation-based system is efficient for user rating and
would be partially included in the authorization step.
The more a user contributes, the more access rights
he/she may get. This is applicable to BCSs for IoT.
The more reputed nodes can process more blocks and
non-reputed ones process less.
• Trusted-computing -based access control scheme
requires distributed administration and provides suitable
solution for authorization step of the BCSs for IoT.
• Identity-based access control solution requires identifi-
cation of the users, thereforemight not be feasible for the
BCSs for IoT (in some specific blockchain applications,
user anonymity might be most desired feature of the
system).
• Capability-based access control solution requires digi-
tal signatures and therefore PKI architecture. Although
this is possible and applicable to BCSs for IoT, it might
not be a suggested solution as construction and mainte-
nance of PKI infrastructure would bring extra burden to
the overall system performance.
• ACL-based access control solution requires hierarchical
network structure (L1 and L2 peers). Hence BCSs use
identical nodes to process the blocks of the ledgers,
ACL-based access control solution cannot be applied.
• Group signature-based access control solution allows
each member of the group to sign on behalf of the
group in an anonymous and unlinkable way. This is very
applicable to BCSs, where peers are identical and there
is no hierarchy.
• Hybrid schemes also use identity-based access control
as a part of their solution, hence not applicable to BCSs
for IoT.
V. APPLICATION OF PERMISSIONED-BLOCKCHAIN
SYSTEMS TO IoT NETWORKS
As mentioned earlier in this text, permissioned-BCSs can be
a remedy in securing IoT systems.
Various cyber-security solutions can be provided to several
entities of the IoT networks by leveraging permissioned-
BCSs, as shown in Figure 3:
1) Nodes (End-devices [EDs]): Physical capture threat
against EDs and eventually extraction of security
parameters can be neutralized by usage of simple
challenge-response protocol in between EDs and GW ,
which then can be logged in to the blockchain for future
inspections of the events.
2) Gateway (GW s): An authentication mechanism for
the GW s is necessary in order to prevent the network
from Rogue-Gateway attacks. For instance, a mutual
authentication can be performed in between the couples
of ED-GW and GW-NS, which then can be logged in to
the blockchain for future inspections of the events.
3) Servers: In IoT, servers need to be trusted entities, oth-
erwise they can create single point of failure for the net-
work. This should be solidified with some professional
advice and/or by providing trust related algorithm sug-
gestions for the server side implementations. This can
be achieved by running trust assuring algorithms and
which also can be logged in to the blockchain for future
inspections of the events.
VI. OPEN ISSUES AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
The open issues in application of BCSs towards the security
of IoT networks can be categorised as follows [37]:
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FIGURE 3. A typical IoT network architecture served by Blockchain consensus for various purposes.
1) Scalability: Scalability is related to the capacity and
constitutes one of the major problems faced by recent
blockchain-based IoT applications. In the case of finan-
cial and monetary transactions, several thousands of
transaction per second happens instantly. However,
this cannot be handled with today’s IoT infrastructure.
The challenge of scalability for blockchain systems
emanates from the fact that current consensus mecha-
nisms and blockchain structures are not efficient and
suited for IoT. This would eventually result in slow
validation of the transactions due to long synchroniza-
tion time, high transaction costs due to large memory
storage and processing power requirements.
2) Interoperability:Asmentioned earlier, either designed
for IoT or not, various BCSs are devised to remedy
special problems of different applications along with
specific constraints and requirements. Thereby, there
is no unique BCS skeleton that can be adopted by each
and every other application. Recently, the ecosystem of
the blockchain is very scattered around as BCSs have
their own protocols, functions and mechanisms that are
not inter operable with each other. It is obvious that
there will be necessarily many BCSs exist and they
have to be designed in accordance to each other so
that they can operate and interact with each other in
a seamless way.
3) Lightweight Consensus Algorithms: As stated ear-
lier, BCSs are power, processor and memory hun-
gry and do not directly suited for IoT networks.
Therefore, in order to apply BCSs to IoT and for
the long term acceptance of the BCSs by the IoT
community; ‘lightweight’ consensus algorithms are
required by addressing the various problems (resource
[power, memory, processing, etc.] consumption, lim-
ited throughput, delay, etc.).
Under the light of the challenges and open problems pre-
sented above, the research directions in application of BCSs
towards the security of IoT networks can be summarized as
follows:
• Cyber-Security Analysis:Abetter understanding of the
system behavior from the cyber-security perspective can
be orchestrated via vulnerability and attack analysis. The
system consistency of the blockchain-based IoT system
can be monitored and verified to detect any potential
changes from the nominal behavior.
• Performance Analysis: The end-to-end performance
analysis of the BCS can be investigated for a complete
cycle of the blockchain, from submitting till when the
related block is engraved in to the blockchain.
• Feasibility Analysis: There are 3 types of feasibility
analysis: 1) Technical feasibility: Integration of exist-
ing systems with the BCSs introduces a big techni-
cal complexity and more costs towards the design,
development, and maintenance phases. 2) Operational
feasibility: The operation mode of BCSs differ from tra-
ditional cloud-based systems as BCSs have previously
mentioned drawbacks and challenges as much as the
advantages they bring. For instance, commercially sen-
sitive information should not be stored at public BCSs
as protection of the the secret is naively impossible
there. Moreover, owing to the immutability of BCSs,
it requires extra attention and effort for renewing smart
contracts on the blockchain. 3) Economic feasibility:
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An intended vendor need to analyze the cost of storing
the generated data on the public or private blockchain
along with the cost of executing and deploying the smart
contracts or certificates. In order to have an understand-
ing on the feasibility of the BCSs to IoT networks, all
3 of the mentioned feasibility analyses should be run.
• Cost Analysis: This is another important ingredient that
needs to be taken into account in the overall assess-
ment. The cost analysis is dependent to many other
sub-components: 1) Monetary cost: It is about storing
the data and executing a smart-contract on the BCS.
2) Keeping cost: This is the cost to keep the blockchain
nodes employed by the BCS application. Even though
this is not a requirement, having your own blockchain
nodes to calculate block operations might significantly
enhance the system response time and decrease over-
all latency. Moreover, if Proof-of-Work is used as the
consensus algorithm, then the cost of keeping your own
blockchain infrastructure might be really costly.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
As in any computer system, access control is a very important
function of securing Blockchain Systems (BCSs). The overall
procedure for access control in BCSs will require three main
steps, namely: authentication, authorization, and revocation.
Performance, cost, and scalability are the main challenges
when integrating blockchain with IoT, owing to the high
volume of data generated by IoT networks. Therefore, per-
missioned BCSs would be more suitable than permissionless
BCSs for IoT platforms. Consequently, this article described
how permissioned BCSs can be leveraged by IoT networks to
increase the security of the network.
Providing access control functionality for permissioned
BCSs is a non-trivial task. In this article, a remedy to this
is provided by investigating the state of the art access con-
trol schemes proposed for P2P networks and elaborating on
their applicability to permissioned BCSs. Table 1 presents all
investigated access control schemes along with their applica-
bility to permissioned BCSs.
From the thorough literature review on P2P systems,
it is deduced that a reasonable access control system pro-
posal for the permissioned BCSs should include the follow-
ing approaches: A threshold signature-based system for the
authentication step, a trusted computing-based system along
with a reputation-based system for the authorization step, and
finally, CRL along with a group signature-based system for
the revocation step. The mentioned steps increase the security
and overall trust of the system. However, applicability to IoT
networks, such as the LoRa-based networks discussed in this
text, needs further investigation and attention, especially in
terms of power consumption and packet delay.
In this article, contrary to some other proposals in the
literature and due to their long processing times for each
transaction (consensus), the authors aim is to avoid the usage
of BCS directly for access control, instead of providing dis-
tributed P2P access control methods as an access control
mechanism for permissioned BCSs. After users are granted
for permissioned BCSs, these can be leveraged by the users
for some other purposes such as data logging, archiving, etc.
Establishing control over cross interactions of the access
control schemes and evaluating their effect on the overall effi-
ciency of the access control system is a non-trivial task. The
system design and implementation of the presented access




List of abbreviations are listed in Table 2.
TABLE 2. List of abbreviations.
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Gävle, Sweden. Since 2008, he has been an Assistant Professor with Mid
Sweden University, where he was appointed as the Head of the Department
of Information and Communication Systems, from 2013 to 2017. Since
2018, he has been the Head of the Department of Information Systems and
Technology, Mid Sweden University.
VOLUME 9, 2021 5441
